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The subject matter of The Antitrust Aspects of Bank Mergers conference -- Banking and the Antitrust Laws -- has received insufficient attention in the legal literature. This is in curious contrast to the quantity of federal statutes that treat the subject: principally, banks have the standard antitrust laws led by the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts; the Bank Merger Act of 1960; and section 2 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. These establish similar, but not identical, antitrust standards for the bank transactions to which they apply. Furthermore, there has been no shortage of bank mergers and acquisitions since Sep 29, 1994, the date on which the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (Riegle-Neal) was enacted. The major contribution of Riegle-Nea...
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Recent federal guidance should remind health care organizations to evaluate the antitrust laws carefully when considering a merger with an actual or potential competitor.
The federal Clayton Act prohibits firms from merging with competitors (that is, merging horizontally) when the effect of such merger may be to lessen competition substantially or to tend to create a monopoly, even when neither of the merging firms actually intends to create a monopoly or otherwise exploit market power.
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This article demonstrates that, in certain situations, the market would benefit if a failing company were allowed to merge, even if it could be reorganized under Chapter 11. Part I of this article explains Section 7 of the Clayton Act and its failing company defense. Part II delves into the reorganization requirement of the failing company defense: its creation in a sick newspaper industry, its development, and the modern defense. Past III analyzes the natural incongruity of Chapter 11 reorganizations with antitrust law due to Chapter 11's objectives of serving the public interest and protecting companies from failure. Returning to the antitrust goal of efficiencies, Part IV discusses potential efficiencies achieved through a merger. Finally, Part V concludes with a detailed economic an...
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This Article examines current judicial interpretation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act through the lens of negotiation theory. The research exposes a gap between how courts state they are analyzing efficiency claims in Section 7 Clayton Act enforcement actions and what they are actually doing. During periods of lax antitrust enforcement, this pattern is not readily visible, since almost all proposed merger and acquisition ("M&A") deals are approved. With a shift to more aggressive antitrust policy, however, it is critical that merger review include appropriate weighing of transaction-generated efficiencies-something missing from courts' current antitrust analysis. Although only a small number of Section 7 cases are litigated each year, corporate negotiators assess thousands of potent...
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... obtaining reports, as required by the Bank Merger Act of 1960, from the Board of Governors of the Fe... alia, that it would violate 7 of the Clayton Act. Held: The proposed consolidation of appellee ...
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... civil antitrust action under 7 of the Clayton Act to challenge a proposed merger between two com...
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...would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. The proposed Final Judgment, fi... 2. The proposed merger would increase International Paper's share of the ...
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...STANDARD FOR EVALUATING THE MERGER III. THIS MERGER IS PRESUMPTIVELY ANTICOMPETITIVE ...INTRODUCTION . Section 7 of the Clayton Act was intended to arrest the anticompetitive eff...
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... Benefits Program and the Proposed Merger The City and several related entities o... the merger under § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15U.S.C. § 18, §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherma...
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...After the merger the three largest banks had 97.9% of the total ban... whether a merger violated 7 of the Clayton Act and 1 of the Sherman Act and mandated a return...