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Summary judgment was not appropriate in the case as to whether OhioHealth Corp. was independently liable. We affirmed the trial court's judgment that OhioHealth cannot be held liable through a theory of agency by estoppel. Judgment affirmed in part; remanded for further appropriate proceedings.
Freedom of contract is a longstanding principle deeply rooted in American jurisprudence, protected by the Contract Clause and by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Because of the legal system's high regard for freedom of contract, parties are free to negotiate virtually all issues, thus creating rights and limiting duties and obligations to one another. In exercising this freedom to contract, parties often negotiate an arbitration clause. When the dispute includes a nonsignatory, courts use five factors to interpret whether agreement exists: incorporation by reference, assumption, agency, veil-piercing/alter ego, and equitable estoppel. Over time, however, courts have been so eager to effectuate the federal policy in favor of arbitration that they have forgo...
The trial court erred in entering summary judgment against the appellants and in favor of appellee Miami Valley Hospital. The Ohio Supreme Courts ruling in Natl. Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Wuerth, 122 Ohio St.3d 594, 2009-Ohio-3601, does not preclude the appellants suit against the hospital for the negligence of its employee technicians even though the technicians were not named as defendants. In addition, genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the hospital may be liable under a theory of agency by estoppel. Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Summary Judgment; Independent Contractor; Agency by Estoppel.
REMITTITUR; PREJUDGMENT INTEREST; MEDICAL MALPRACTICE; ECONOMIC AND NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES; JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT (“JNOV”); MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL; CIV.R. 59; CIV.R. 60(B); MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT; DIRECTED VERDICT; SPOLIATION AND/OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES; ABUSE OF DISCRETION; DE NOVO; EXCESSIVE DAMAGES; VICARIOUS LIABILITY; AGENCY BY ESTOPPEL.
Torts—Respondeat superior—Independent contractors—Agency by estoppel—Principal cannot be liable if statute of limitations has run against primarily liable agent.
... superior -- Independent contractors -- Agency by estoppel -- Principal cannot be liable if statu...
Standing; waiver; form over substance; beneficial interest in promissory note; mortgage; independent review of magistrates decision; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; assignee liability; fraud in the inducement; civil conspiracy; agency relationship; de facto agent; apparent agency theory; agency by estoppel; apparent authority; implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing; admissibility of evidence; expert testimony; experts failure to offer an opinion; public documents; judicial notice; best evidence rule; authenticity; duplicate of original; R.C. 1303.35(A); Civ.R. 53; Evid.R. 702; Evid.R. 207; Evid.R. 1002; Evid.R. 1003; Loc.R. 21.2(B).
Summary judgment; agency by estoppel; intentional tort by independent contractor.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT; MEDICAL MALPRACTICE; STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS; TERMINATION RULE; CONTINUING TREATMENT; SPECIALIST; POST-OPERATIVE CARE; COMER v. RISKO DOCTRINE; AGENCY-BY-ESTOPPEL; VICARIOUS LIABILITY; INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR.
Apparent or ostensible authority; agency by estoppel; genuine issues of material fact exist when malpractice.
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